Groupthink as Communication Process, Not Outcome by Kramer, Michael W. & Dougherty, Debbie S.
Instructions for authors, subscriptions and further details: 
http://csc.hipatiapress.com 
Groupthink as Communication Process, not Outcome 
Michael W. Kramer1, &  Debbie S. Dougherty2  
1) Department of Communication, University of Oklahoma. United States of
America 
2) Department of Communication, University of Missouri. United States of
America. 
Date of publication: October 1st , 2013 
Edition period: October 2013-January 2014 
To cite this article: Kramer, M.W., & Dougherty, D. S. (2013). Groupthink 
as Communication Process, not Outcome. Communication & Social Change 
1(1), 44-62 doi: 10.4471/csc.2013.03  
To link this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.4471/csc.2013.03  
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE  
The terms and conditions of use are related to the Open Journal System and 
to Creative Commons Non-Commercial and Non-Derivative License. 
C&SC – Communication & Social Change Vol. 1 No. 1  October 2013 
pp. 44-62 
 
 
 
2013 Hipatia Press 
ISSN: 2014-5462 
DOI: 10.4471/csc.2013.03 
Groupthink as Communication 
Process, not Outcome  
 
Michael W. Kramer 
University of Oklahoma  
 
Debbie S. Dougherty 
University of Missouri 
(Received: 24 September 2012; Accepted: 5 November 2012; Published: 1 
October 2013) 
 
Abstract 
A bias of groupthink research is that it primarily examines group decisions that are 
viewed as catastrophic failures, such as the Bay of Pigs fiasco. An alternative 
approach focuses on groupthink as a faulty communication process rather than 
defining it by negative outcomes. Taking such an approach, this paper briefly 
explores some potential examples of decisions that may have involved groupthink 
communication processes but either had ambiguous outcomes or succeeded in 
accomplishing their goals. The analysis suggests the need to explore the 
communication processes that result in groupthink while recognizing that the 
outcomes may be negative, ambiguous, or even positive. 
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Resumen 
Un sesgo de la investigación en pensamiento de grupo, es que principalmente 
examina las decisiones de un grupo vistas como fallos catastróficos, como el caso 
del fiasco de la bahía de cochinos. Una aproximación alternativa se centra en 
acercarse al pensamiento de grupo como un proceso defectuoso más que por sus 
resultados negativos. Cogiendo esto como una perspectiva, este artículo explora 
brevemente algunos ejemplos potenciales de decisiones que, proviniendo de 
procesos de pensamiento de grupo, han tenido resultados ambiguos o, incluso, han 
tenido éxito en conseguir sus objetivos. El análisis sugiere la necesidad de explorar 
procesos de comunicación dados en procesos de pensamiento de grupo, 
reconociendo sus objetivos como negativos, ambíguos o, incluso, positivos.  
Palabras clave: comunicación en grupo, pensamiento de grupo, toma de 
decisiones 
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reek1 and Greek2 were two fraternities at a large university. They 
were alike in history, tradition, status, and size. Both participate in 
the annual process of recruiting and selecting new members. When 
the university adopted a policy strictly forbidding hazing, both insisted that 
it was their right to initiate recruits in the traditions of their order and that 
the university was simply anti-Greek. Both secretly continued their hazing 
rituals for several years and suffered no consequences. There was little 
difference between what the two did. Then one year a recruit in Greek1 
became violently ill during the drinking ritual and was taken by ambulance 
to the local hospital. As a result, Greek1 was investigated for hazing and 
suspended from campus recruiting for two years. In Greek2 the recruits 
illegally drank similar amounts, but no one got ill enough to go to the 
hospital. As a result, there was no investigation and no suspension. 
Viewing these hypothetical scenarios through the typical groupthink 
framework, researchers would conclude that the decision-making process at 
Greek1 illustrated groupthink. Members of Greek1 exhibited most of the 
characteristics of groupthink including high cohesiveness, illusion of 
invulnerability, collective rationalizing, failure to consider consequences, 
and a variety of other problems (Street, 1997). While it seems appropriate to 
conclude that Greek1 demonstrated groupthink, it is equally appropriate to 
say that groupthink occurred in Greek2 since they used the same decision-
making characteristics and enacted the same inappropriate behaviors. Yet it 
is unlikely that Greek2 would ever be examined for groupthink processes 
because there was no negative outcome. The outcome differences were not 
indicative of better decision making in Greek2. The outcome differences 
were probably a matter of luck. 
Typically, groupthink is considered a possibility only when the outcomes 
are disastrous in line with the tradition of the early work by Janis (1972). 
The defining characteristic of most groupthink research is that it results “in 
extremely defective decision-making performance by the group” (Turner & 
Pratkanis, 1998, p. 106) or more pointedly one might conclude that 
“groupthink is the primary cause of fiasco in the modern world” (Peterson et 
al., 1998, p. 273). Even one of the scholars who clearly states that 
groupthink does not always result in bad decisions then proceeds to focus on 
typical negative outcome when she analyzes the Bay of Pigs military fiasco 
(Flippen, 1999). The focus of most research on groupthink then is to find 
G 
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examples of poor decision-making outcomes and work backwards to find 
evidence of groupthink processes in a retrospective sense-making process 
(Fuller & Aldag, 1998). Other scholars attempt to create groupthink 
processes, such as high cohesion, in a lab to produce negative outcomes. 
However, few experimental studies document “the hallmark of groupthink: 
the low quality, defective decisions” (Turner & Pratkanis, 1998, p. 110). 
Overall, research has generally failed to consider that the communication 
processes that characterize groupthink can result in disastrous, ambiguous, 
or even positive outcomes. Exploring these possibilities seems warranted 
given that organizational decisions, effective or ineffective, can be the result 
of almost random processes (e.g. garbage can model, Cohen, March, & 
Olsen, 1972) and there is evidence that suggests that groupthink processes 
are not strongly associated with ineffective decisions (Peterson et al., 1998).  
This manuscript explores the notion that groupthink should be defined 
more by the communication process rather than by the outcome. After 
briefly reviewing the characteristics of groupthink, it examines two 
examples, Operation Desert Storm and the enactment of teamwork at ISE 
(Barker, 1993), that illustrate characteristics of groupthink even though the 
outcomes may not be considered negative. Then, it briefly examines the 
practices of terrorist groups to demonstrate that the outcomes related to 
groupthink process may be evaluated as positive, negative, or ambiguous 
depending on the perspective taken. 
 
The Groupthink Model 
 
Since extensive reviews of groupthink exist elsewhere (e.g., Esser, 1998; 
Street, 1997), what follows is a brief summary of major conceptual 
components. The ground-breaking work on groupthink conducted by Janis 
(1971, 1972, 1982) identifies the major characteristics of groupthink. 
Groupthink involves high cohesiveness and concurrence-seeking that 
interferes with critical thinking. It results in a deterioration of mental 
efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment. In selecting his examples of 
groupthink, Janis (1982) selected ones that exhibited seven major defects in 
decision-making: 1) Discussions were limited to few alternative courses of 
action; 2) Groups did not survey the objectives to be fulfilled or the values 
implicit in the choices; 3) Groups failed to reexamine the initially-preferred 
48 Kramer & Dougherty–Groupthink 
 
 
action for non-obvious risks or drawbacks; 4) Groups failed to consider 
possible benefits of alternatives initially rejected by the majority; 5) Groups 
made little or no attempt to consult experts; 6) Groups demonstrated 
selection bias by attending to information supportive of their views and 
disregarding that which did not; and 7) Groups spent little time deliberating 
about their decision and had no contingency plans for unforeseen obstacles. 
Street (1997) presents a comprehensive model of groupthink that 
included much of the research conducted beyond Janis’s initial work. 
Antecedent conditions include cohesiveness—a necessary but insufficient 
condition; structural faults, such as group isolation; and a proactive 
situational context, such as stress from an external threat. These antecedent 
conditions lead to concurrence-seeking tendencies. The resulting symptoms 
include an overestimation of the group, such as an illusion of invulnerability 
and a sense of group morality; close-mindedness, including collective 
rationalization and stereotyping of outgroup members; and pressure toward 
uniformity, such as self-censorship and an illusion of unanimity. Decision-
making defects include incomplete survey of alternatives, objectives, or 
information, a failure to examine preferred or rejected choices, and a failure 
to have a contingency plan.  
A variety of research has confirmed many of these characteristics 
although the results typically only support parts of the groupthink model. 
For example, in initial experimental studies in the laboratory, Courtright 
(1978) found evidence of the importance of the presence or absence of 
disagreement in discriminating between non-groupthink and groupthink 
groups. In additional experimental studies, Cline (1990) developed a method 
for observing and analyzing the illusion of unanimity in groups. She 
followed this up with a case study using the Watergate break-in and cover-
up transcripts to demonstrate the importance of the same construct (Cline, 
1994). Flippen (1999) explored the personal goals for participating in the 
group as part of the antecedent conditions for groupthink processes.  
The mixed findings on groupthink variables can perhaps be explained by 
the lack of research questioning the final box in Street’s (1997) model which 
is labeled “poor decision outcomes.” Most groupthink scholarship, including 
the work of Janis, attributes ill-fated decision to poor decision-making 
processes like groupthink and positive outcomes to sound or rational 
decision-making processes (Choi & Kim, 1999). Most of the typical 
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groupthink examples are consistent with this notion. Many of these poor 
outcomes are the result of faulty decision making in high profile political 
decisions and the research consists largely of retrospective case studies (with 
the exception of a few laboratory studies). Some of the more frequently 
mentioned examples come from the initial work of Janis (1982) such as the 
Bay of Pigs, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and the Cuban missile crisis. 
Janis (1982) and Cline (1994) discuss the Watergate break-in and subsequent 
cover-up as groupthink. Although some scholars have argued that the 
Challenger disaster was the result of faulty decision-making other than 
groupthink (Hirokawa, Gouran, & Martz, 1988), it and the Columbia 
disasters are often mentioned as groupthink examples—primarily because 
the outcomes were disastrous. During discussions of groupthink in college 
classrooms, undergraduates frequently add cult examples such as David 
Koresh and the Branch Davidians in Texas as examples of groupthink 
marked by disastrous outcomes.  
Although disastrous outcomes draw attention to possible groupthink, it 
seems likely that groupthink processes occur far more frequently than the 
few examples that are reported in the media. Some disastrous outcomes 
likely receive little attention due to how uneventful they are, such as when 
small business owners enact groupthink and go out of business as a result.  
There is also evidence that groupthink processes do not necessarily lead to 
negative outcomes. In exploring decisions in a business setting, Choi and 
Kim (1999) found that groupthink factors had both positive and negative 
relationships to performance after a crisis, but other factors such as use of 
internal and external resources and the quality of implementation were more 
significant predictors of the outcomes. Similarly, in a reanalysis of historical 
cases Janis used, Kramer (1998) did not find strong relationships between 
various components in the model and claims of groupthink. Thus, it seems 
likely that many groups use a groupthink process, but the outcomes are 
positive or at least ambiguous enough that no discussion of the faulty 
decision-making process ever occurs. To examine this premise, two 
examples, one from the headlines and one from a research article illustrate 
the possibility of a groupthink process followed by either positive or 
ambiguous outcomes.  
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Groupthink as “Successful” in Operation Desert Storm  
 
By most criteria, Operation Desert Storm, the first war in Iraq in 1991, under 
President George Bush Sr. was a success. The American people supported 
the effort and supported the troops during the war, with few exceptions. The 
stated goal of the military operation was accomplished; the Iraqi troops of 
Saddam Hussein were driven out of Kuwait in a military rout (Excerpts from 
briefing by Schwarzkopf in Saudi Arabia, 1991, 1B).  President Bush 
achieved his highest approval ratings from the American people in the 
months after the war, although that approval did not last until the next 
election cycle. Despite the success of this endeavor, there is evidence to 
suggest that the decision makers succumbed to groupthink processes. 
The evidence of groupthink by the decision-makers involved in 
Operation Desert Storm is fairly limited, but makes a rather compelling case. 
After the Iraqi troops had been routed from Kuwait, the decision was made 
to suspend their pursuit into Iraq and not to remove Saddam Hussein from 
office. Published reports regarding this decision suggest pressure toward 
uniformity—particularly in the form of the illusion of unanimity. General 
Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of the allied troops in Desert Storm 
reported the following conversation with Colin Power regarding when to end 
the war: 
“So here’s what I propose,” I said. “I want the Air Force to keep 
bombing those convoys backed up at the Euphrates where the 
bridges are blown. I want to continue the ground attack 
tomorrow, drive to the sea, and totally destroy everything in our 
path. That’s the way I wrote the plan for Desert Storm, and in 
one more day we’ll be done.” I paused: “Do you realize if we 
stop tomorrow night, the ground campaign will have lasted five 
days? How does that sound to you: the ‘Five-Day War’?” 
(Schwarzkopf & Petre, 1992, p. 471) 
A short period of time later, Powell called Schwarzkopf and told him 
they wanted to end the war at 9:00 P.M. instead of waiting for the next day. 
Schwarzkopf responded “I don’t have any problem with it” (Schwarzkopf & 
Petre, 1992, p. 470). While Schwarzkopf offers a number of reasons for his 
sudden change of heart, additional sources suggest that he did indeed have a 
problem with discontinuing the pursuit of the Iraqi troops. In a national 
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television interview approximately four weeks after the ceasefire, 
Schwarzkopf stated: 
Frankly, my recommendation had been, you know, to continue to 
march. I mean, we had them in a rout and could have continued 
to wreak great destruction on them. We could have completely 
closed the doors and made it in fact a battle of annihilation. . . 
.There were obviously a lot of people who escaped who 
wouldn’t have escaped if the decision hadn’t been made to stop 
where we were at that time. (as cited in Record, 1993, p. 125). 
After publicly stating his disagreement with the decision to end the war, 
Schwarzkopf quickly recanted a few days later after being criticized for his 
remarks by President Bush: 
Schwarzkopf said he had apologized for his “poor choice of 
words” in questioning Bush’s judgment about calling a cease-
fire. . .Schwarzkopf said in a brief meeting with reporters: “I 
agreed 100 percent with the decision. I thought it was a correct 
decision then, and I think it’s a correct decision now.” 
(Schwarzkopf Apologizes: Bush Accepts, 1991, 1A) 
Based on his private memoirs and television interview, Schwarzkopf 
clearly had a problem with ending the war as soon as it was ended. By 
saying that he had “no problem with it” when he spoke to Colin Powell and 
by stating he was 100 percent in agreement with the decision later, he 
supported an appearance of unanimity. Schwarzkopf appeared to have been 
pressured to state agreement with the group decision when he did not in fact 
agree at all. The fact that he was pressured to publicly support the decision 
four weeks after the decision was made provides strong evidence of pressure 
for unanimity within the decision-making group. There may have been 
others who privately disagreed with the decision, but remained silent due to 
the pressure from above to conform. This suggests that other characteristics 
of groupthink may also have been present as well. 
It is true that in retrospect, some pundits have argued that the decision not 
to chase down the Iraqi troops and remove Saddam Hussein from authority 
at that time was a bad decision. It can even be argued that it had disastrous 
effects both on the Iraqi minorities who were brutally attacked by Hussein’s 
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regime after the war and on the United States embroiled in the second war in 
Iraq beginning in 2003. Nonetheless, it certainly was not the opinion at the 
time that either the war or the decision to stop after liberating Kuwait was a 
mistake.  
Interestingly, claims that the decision makers in this successful campaign 
practiced groupthink have not been heard, although such claims are 
frequently heard in the cases of failed military interventions such as the Bay 
of Pigs or the Vietnam War. Despite evidence of groupthink at the decision-
making level, Operation Desert Storm is rarely, if ever, mentioned as a 
possible example of groupthink. This omission appears to be due to the bias 
of starting with disastrous outcomes and looking back for evidence of 
groupthink rather than examining group processes first and then considering 
that groupthink processes may dramatically increase the probability of 
negative outcomes, but may still result in positive outcomes in some 
instances despite faulty decision making. 
 
Groupthink and Ambiguous Outcomes in Concertive Control 
 
A second published example suggests that groupthink processes can lead to 
ambiguous outcomes. In his article, Barker (1993) describes the process by 
which an organization changed from a hierarchical management philosophy 
to one based on teamwork. On the basis of his analysis, he concludes that the 
team members eventually developed a system of concertive control in which 
they monitored each other and imposed more stringent regulations on 
themselves than management did prior to the change in philosophy. Barker’s 
analysis is valuable, but he does not examine whether the teams in his study 
participated in groupthink processes. Perhaps this omission is due to 
outcomes being rather ambiguous depending on how the assessment of 
success is conceptualized for the organization and the group. 
Although it is not possible on the basis of the article’s content to 
determine whether all the characteristics of groupthink were evident in this 
group, as Moorhead, Neck, and West (1998) suggest in their analysis, there 
seems to be strong evidence in Barker’s article of a number of characteristics 
of groupthink, including high cohesion, poor decision-making norms, and 
strong leadership by senior team members.  Further analysis reveals that 
there is evidence of some of the antecedent conditions, concurrence-seeking, 
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groupthink symptoms, and decision-making defects. An assessment of 
whether the decisions were poor depends on who defines success. 
Barker (1993) provides ample evidence of the antecedent conditions for 
groupthink. There was strong group cohesiveness as team members 
supported each other. Structural faults existed; the team was insulated from 
other teams and over time accepted a homogenous set of values. The 
situational context provided stress as evidenced by external threats due to 
downturns in product demand resulting in layoffs and from the need to meet 
production deadlines or lose jobs.  This stress led to a strong demand for 
concurrence seeking in the form of consensus decision making.  
Symptoms of groupthink were less obvious than the antecedent 
conditions, but they certainly existed. There was obvious pressure toward 
uniformity. Group members who had conflicts with demands to meet 
production goals had to negotiate alternative times to provide apparently 
unpaid overtime. There was an illusion of unanimity as a number of 
members privately voiced discontent with the team but practiced self-
censorship by accepting the decisions of the team without protest. Close-
mindedness and mind guard were apparent when the old timers of the group 
met to decide the fate of a newcomer who was not buying into their values 
sufficiently. 
Decision-making defects were also apparent. Perhaps the strongest 
evidence of this was the team’s decision to place an attendance board in the 
break room. The team placed a board listing who was late and absent each 
day in full view of all team members and anyone else who happened to visit 
the room. Had management ever suggested such a policy, the team members 
would undoubtedly have protested it and worked to change this 
embarrassing and inappropriate treatment. That they adopted it themselves 
suggests that the team did a less than thorough examination of their 
objectives and of alternatives. There is little evidence that they examined the 
positive and negative effects of this preferred choice.   
Despite meeting the major characteristics of groupthink, the decision 
outcomes were quite ambiguous. It is easy to argue that the team was largely 
successful. They continued to meet productivity and quality standards. 
However, team morale was low and the concertive control that resulted from 
the decision-making process was more confining and oppressive than the 
management and bureaucratic control that existed prior to the change to 
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teamwork. Given the bias toward beginning with disastrous outcomes in 
looking for groupthink, it is not surprising that situations with ambiguous 
decision outcomes like this are rarely examined from a groupthink 
perspective. On careful analysis, these teams appeared to exhibit groupthink 
processes, but without the obvious disastrous outcomes typically assumed 
necessary. 
 
Terrorist Groups “Succeed” Using Groupthink 
 
With the limited access to decision making within terrorist groups, it is 
difficult to provide a comprehensive analysis of their groupthink 
characteristics. Nonetheless, there is sufficient evidence of the antecedent 
conditions, concurrence seeking, symptoms of groupthink, and decision-
making defects. The assessment of whether decisions resulted in poor 
outcomes depends on the perspective taken. Rather than discussing terrorist 
groups in general, this analysis focuses on the processes apparent in the Al 
Qaeda terrorist group that led to the September 11 attacks on the World 
Trade Towers and other targets.  
Antecedent conditions of groupthink were apparent in the Al Qaeda 
leadership. According to the 9/11 Commission Report (2004), Al Qaeda 
leadership consisted of a tight-knit group of individuals who were insulated 
from most of modern civilization. This group resided in remote areas of 
Afghanistan, surrounded by like-minded individuals—most of whom were 
trained and indoctrinated by Osama Bin Ladin. The Commission reports that 
Bin Ladin hand picked the individuals who would carry out the attacks—
individuals who were the most rabid and committed of extremists.  
Interestingly according to the 9/11 Commission Report, there was not 
consensus at the leadership level as to whether or not Al Qaeda should carry 
out the attacks against the United States. Bin Ladin believed the mission was 
of fundamental importance while others believed that Al Qaeda needed to 
either attack Jews or finish the ongoing war in Afghanistan. It is apparent 
that this dissent was ignored by the Al Qaeda leadership, suggesting that 
groupthink processes may have been at play. While we do not have the 
details available to make a definitive case that this group engaged in 
groupthink, there is some evidence to support this contention. First, as 
previously mentioned, the group was highly isolated. Second, the group 
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believed that it held the moral high ground. At one point Bin Ladin claimed 
that the United States was the worst civilization in the history of the world 
and that the U.S. would continue to be the enemy until it became an Islamic 
State (9/11 Commission, 2004). These and similar statements by members of 
the Al Qaeda leadership suggest that the group was close-minded. 
Specifically the members rationalized violence against civilian targets by 
stereotyping U.S. citizens within a narrow cultural identity.  
Not only does it seem likely that the Al Qaeda central leadership group 
used groupthink processes, it is also likely that the cell groups that carried 
out the actual attacks were engaged in groupthink. Specifically, evidence 
suggests that the antecedent conditions for groupthink existed in these cells. 
These cell groups were insulated, living in secret within the United States for 
some time, with very little contact with even the larger Al Qaeda network. 
The primary contact was with Mohamed Atta, the tactical leader of the 
operation (9/11 Commission Report, 2004). The groups were homogeneous 
in values, representing a militant sect of Islam. They were also largely 
homogeneous in ethnic background, comprised primarily of radical Islamic 
Arabs.   
In addition to antecedent conditions, many of the symptoms of 
groupthink were also apparent. Group members overestimated the group: 
They saw it as impossible to fail with Allah on their side and they believed 
in the morality of their actions calling it a jihad, a holy war.  Close-
mindedness was evident in the way that the group stereotyped and 
demonized outgroup members (primarily the United States) and collectively 
rationalized attacking non-military personnel because the jihad was against 
the entire culture, not just the leadership or military. Without additional 
insider information, it is difficult to determine the degree of pressure toward 
uniformity present in the group although the existence of training camps 
suggests that indoctrination and pressure to uniformity were present. Clearly 
there was uniformity as individuals enacted the same actions, but whether 
this was due to pressure on dissenters, self-censorship, mind guards, or an 
illusion of unanimity is unclear. It appears that there was unanimity. 
Certainly from a Western perspective, Al Qaeda decision makers 
exhibited decision-making defects. Westerners would no doubt argue that 
the terrorists failed to consider alternatives that would influence the United 
States in a more positive manner and failed to consider if killing innocent 
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people was consistent with their objectives. The terrorists failed to consider 
the possible negative consequences of their decision to attack. In the process 
of continuing to demonize an entire culture, they selected information that 
kept their anger toward the United States peaked.  
Although it is relatively easy to make the argument that Al Qaeda used 
groupthink processes, it is more difficult to determine whether their decision 
resulted in poor outcomes since meanings assigned to the 9-11 events 
diverge significantly across cultures (Dougherty, Mobley, & Smith, 2010). 
From the terrorists’ perspective, their actions were highly successful. Unlike 
the previous attempt at bombing the World Trade Towers, this time the 
terrorists completely destroyed their primary target and caused serious 
damage to the Pentagon. The exact target of the fourth plane may never be 
known. The attacks were the most disruptive terrorist events in history 
costing thousands of lives, billions of dollars in damaged and destroyed 
property, and billions of dollars in lost economic activity and increased 
security efforts. For example, the cost of national security in the form of 
defense, homeland security, and international affairs rose by almost 200 
billion dollars between fiscal years 2001 and 2004 (9/11 Commission, 
2004). The fear of further attacks continues to cost billions of dollars and 
disrupts activities throughout the world. In addition to the fiscal costs of the 
attack, the emotional and personal toll taken on the American people is even 
larger and cannot be assessed in any dollar terms. Although our Western 
perspective may have difficulty seeing these as positive outcomes, these 
were largely the goals of the decision makers of the operation. 
It is also possible to view the outcomes negatively, even from the 
terrorists’ perspective. In much the same way that the attacks on Pearl 
Harbor awakened “the sleeping giant,” the United States, which ultimately 
led to the demise of the Japanese empire, the September 11 attacks 
unleashed a fury against Al Qaeda that continues to this day and eventually 
led to the death of its leader Osama bin Laden. Their base of operation in 
Afghanistan was disrupted and although they continue to operate, it is not 
possible to determine how effective they are in comparison to their strength 
prior to the attacks. Since it is impossible to predict the final outcome at this 
time, it is possible that the outcome will be ambiguous with the Al Qaeda 
decision makers having gained significant short-term outcomes, but 
decreased the likelihood of achieving their long-term goals.  
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In sum, the decision makers of Al Qaeda appear to have exhibited most 
of the groupthink processes. Whether these resulted in poor decision 
outcomes depends largely on the perspective taken in evaluating the 
outcomes. The groupthink processes led to significant short-term 
accomplishments from the group’s perspective, although their success in 
achieving long-term goals is unclear. 
 
Discussion 
 
One of the biases that has prevailed in the groupthink literature is an 
assumption that because groupthink is an ineffective decision-making 
process, it necessarily results in negative or disastrous outcomes. This bias is 
evident in the way that nearly all typical examples of groupthink begin with 
negative, even catastrophic outcomes, whether it was the Bay of Pigs, the 
Vietnam War, or the Challenger and Columbia explosions, and then work 
back to retrospectively examine the faulty decision-making processes.  Like 
the original work by Janis (1972), such retrospective case studies of negative 
outcomes are the predominant examples of groupthink. 
Although it is likely that using groupthink decision processes increase the 
chances of poor decisions and negative outcomes and likewise, that using 
critical thinking decision-making processes increase the probability of good 
quality decisions and positive outcomes, these increased probabilities do not 
automatically lead to the corresponding outcomes. For example, the same 
groupthink processes that led to the Challenger disaster probably occurred 
on the July 1985 space shuttle flight on which the o-rings came dangerously 
close to failing due to cold temperatures, but did not fail (Hirokawa et al., 
1988). The difference in outcomes was not related to differences in decision-
making processes but almost random, unpredictable factors. 
By examining other decision-making groups that seem to fit the 
groupthink decision-making model, this analysis suggests that while 
groupthink always involves poor decision-making processes, it can lead to 
negative outcomes, ambiguous outcomes, or even successful outcomes. This 
is consistent with the findings that groupthink processes have inconsistent 
relationships to outcomes and that other factors like implementation and use 
of resources or even luck may be more important factors (Choi & Kim, 
1999; Peterson et al., 1998). Of course, an important consideration is that the 
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evaluation of the outcome depends on whose perception of success is 
accepted. The historical examples of Operation Desert Storm and the 
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, as well as an 
analysis of decision making by the team members in Barker’s (1993) article, 
suggest that groups can fall prey to groupthink processes, make decisions 
that are poor at least from some perspectives, and still largely achieve their 
goals. This suggests a need to further consider the groupthink model. 
A focus on groupthink processes instead of outcomes would open up the 
field of research significantly and at the same time address the limitations of 
previous research based on retrospective and historic accounts of decision 
making or studies conducted in laboratory settings. So, for example, instead 
of examining situations where disastrous outcomes have already occurred, 
researchers could focus on research settings where groupthink is likely to 
occur. In such settings researchers could explore whether cohesion based on 
personal attractiveness or based on task pride and commitment has 
differential impact on group outcomes (McCauley, 1998) or whether the 
political goals or self-interests of leaders are more significant factors in 
producing the negative outcome (Kramer, 1998). A wide range of 
community groups from environmental groups, to animal rights groups, to 
religious organizations seem to be fertile grounds for observing groupthink 
processes in action. It would also seem that the more extreme the group is in 
its beliefs, the more likely groupthink processes would occur regardless of 
the outcomes. 
A focus on the groupthink processes instead of the outcomes will place 
the study of groupthink more squarely on communication processes and 
group dynamics instead of primarily on sociological or psychological 
variables. It is through communication and group dynamics that group 
members insulate themselves and develop homogenous values. It is through 
communication and group dynamics that group members create real or 
imagined external threats and stereotype outgroup members. It is through 
communication and group dynamics that group members create a sense of 
group morality and invulnerability.  
Given that it is through communication and group dynamics that 
groupthink processes occur, it is not surprising that solutions to groupthink 
involve communication as well. Janis (1982) recommends a number of ways 
of avoiding groupthink, although he sees dangers in each of them. He 
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recommends assigning a critical evaluator or a devil’s advocate. The leader 
should remain impartial, not stating preferences, at least initially. Separate 
groups should discuss issues to see if both come to the same conclusion. 
Group members should discuss decisions with people outside the group for 
feedback. Outside experts should be consulted. Group members should 
survey the environment and construct alternative scenarios to consider. A 
second meeting should be held to reconsider decisions. Each of these 
involves an effort at changing the group dynamics and communication to 
avoid groupthink processes. However, research needs to examine how to 
effectively use each in practice. For example, it would be easy to assign a 
devil’s advocate but then simply treat that input as token critical thinking 
with the result being no actual change in decision-making. Conversely, the 
group can value the devil’s advocate so strongly that the group becomes 
paralyzed and unable to take action for fear of groupthink. 
 Groupthink processes lead to decisions that are not based on the type of 
rational, logical decision making that is expected, although rarely achieved, 
in groups (e.g., Dewey, 1910). Most of the primary examples of groupthink 
suggest that these failures in decision-making processes lead to negative and 
disastrous outcomes. The present analysis suggests that groupthink processes 
are ineffective. As such they increase the probability of negative outcomes, 
but groupthink can also lead to ambiguous or positive outcomes. Examining 
the communication processes involved rather than focusing on the negative 
outcomes will increase the understanding of effective and ineffective 
decision making. 
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